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Home Rule in Pennsylvania
I.

Introduction

Gauged by the usual slow rate of evolution in local government,
state-wide home rule in Pennsylvania is a relatively recent phenomenon. I
With the passage of Act 62 in April of 1972,2 all municipalities in the
Commonwealth were permitted for the first time to adopt charters as a
source of authority for home rule legislation and alterations in local
government structure. 3 The concept of home rule is not difficult to grasp:
the source of authority to act in specified areas is transferred from the state
and the various municipal codes to the individual municipality and its home
rule charter.4 Act 62, on the other hand, is a complex, sometimes
ambiguous document that requires eventual judicial construction to clarify
its meaning. 5 The language adopted by the Pennsylvania General Assem1. The structure of local government in the United States has changed only slightly in
the past two hundred years. H. JAMES, LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 90 (1921).

For an excellent discussion of the early history of local government in Pennsylvania, see E.
GOULD, LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN PENNSYLVANIA (1883). See also H. ALDERFER, PENNSYLVANIA LOCAL GOVERNMENT,

1681-1974 (1975).

2. Act of April 13, 1972, P.L. 184, No. 62 (codified at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53,§§ 1-101 to
1-1309 (1974 & Supp. 1976-77) ).
3. Act 62 extended availability of home rule to those municipalities classified as other
than first class cities by § 101 of the General Municipal Law. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 101
(1974). Cities of the first class had already been given home rule powers by the First Class City
Home Rule Act. Act of April 21, 1949, P.L. 665, No. 155 (codified at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§
13101-13157 (1957 & Supp. 1976-77) ).
4. Vanlandingham, Municipal Home Rule in the United States, 10 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 269, 280 (1968-69). The statement presented is not intended to be a comprehensive
"definition" of the term "home rule." Rather it should be considered an operational aid,
describing what home rule does rather than what home rule is.
Defining "what home rule is" is a more difficult task. Professor H.L. McBain opens his
leading work on the subject by stating:
Broadly construed the term 'municipal home rule' has reference to any power
of self-government that may be conferred upon a city, whether the grant of such
power be referable to statute or constitution. In American usage, however, the term
has become associated with those powers that are vested in cities by constitutional
provisions, and more especially provisions that extend to cities the authority to
frame and adopt their own charters. Powers thus conferred by the people of the
state through the medium of their fundamental law create for the city constitutional
rights which may, like the similar rights of private persons, be defended in the
courts against invasion by the legislative arm of the government. Such rights it
would seem are appropriately designated rights of home rule. This is certainly the
sense in which the term 'home rule' is descriptively employed by our courts in an
ever increasing number of cases, although in point of fact the term has never been
given legal definition and can scarcely be regarded as a term of our law at all.
H. MCBAIN, THE LAW AND THE PRACTICE OF MUNICIPAL HOME RULE at v (1916).
Additional definitions serve no useful purpose at this stage in the development of the law.
The theory of home rule exists and is being utilized extensively by state governments. It is,
therefore, more useful to think in terms of the functional concept of home rule.
5. Of course it is not asserted that judicial construction of a statute is an unavoidable or
even an undesirable occurrence. Bona fide challenges to the clearest provisions will require

bly does not delineate home rule powers in distinct unmistakable terms.
Municipalities are asked to venture at their own risk into murky waters that
abound with legal obstacles. The result is predictable. Charters in effect
since January 1975 have been used for little more than restructuring the
local government. 6 Municipalities are understandably reluctant to move
into "gray areas" 7 where their authority is uncertain. The heralded grant of
local autonomy has developed into a waiting game among municipalities,
each hoping to avoid challenges against an uncertain exercise of authority.
This comment examines in detail the powers and limitations sections of
Act 628 in order to define the boundaries of home rule authority. The
numerous proscriptions of the Act will be converted into positive statements of areas in which home rule powers can be expected to supersede
state legislation. Some conclusions reached herein are not based on
primary authority and are necessarily speculative. It is hoped, nevertheless, that the author's opinions will provide some guidance to municipalities in forming a home rule legislation policy.
II.

Historical Background

The origins of local government in Pennsylvania, and indeed in the
United States, must be traced to the early colonial period. During these
formative years the present relationships between state and local
authorities took root. The initial constitutive document of the Commenwealth is Penn's Charter, granted by Charles II in 1681.9 By the Charter,
William Penn was authorized to divide his province into various levels of
organization to facilitate the administration of government.1 0 Counties,
townships, boroughs, towns and cities were created by authority of the
Charter as basic forms of local government, and persist to the present day.
Throughout the early development of Pennsylvania, sovereign power
rested solely with the provincial government, 1I notwithstanding the rapid
rate at which municipal responsibilities were increasing. I2 The first constitutions of the Commonwealth solidified the proposition of state
sovereignty to such an extent that it was virtually beyond challenge by
judicial resolution. Passage of an act that requires judicial construction to eliminate ambiguity
is undesirable and places those subject to the act in an unfavorable position. Murray v. City of
Philadelphia, 364 Pa. 157, 71 A.2d 280 (1950).
6. The first home rule charters went into effect in January 1975. These chartered
municipalities include Bradford Woodsborough, Green Tree Borough, McCandless Township, and Whitehall Borough. Many more charters have gone into effect since that time, with
the same or similar results.
7. D. Powell, Applicability of Statutes to Pennsylvania Home Rule Municipalities, vi
(1973) (unpublished thesis presented to Faculty of Wharton School, Univ. of Pa.).
8. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 1-301, 1-302 (1974 & Supp. 1976-77).
9.

J. TANGER, H. ALDERFER & M. GEARY, PENNSYLVANIA GOVERNMENT, STATE AND

LOCAL 49 (2d ed. 1950).
10.
(1935).

11.
12.

W. HOLCOMB, PENNSYLVANIA BOROUGHS AND AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETY

7

Id.at 9-12.

L.

GAMM, J. JAMES, & J. KARLESKY, PENNSYLVANIA LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND THE
HOME RULE CHARTER AND OPTIONAL PLANS LAW at 1-4 (1974).

municipalities. '3 The doctrine of inherent right to local self-government
was given but limited attention by legal minds of the era1 4 while the
contrary view found general acceptance in the courts. 15 The view favoring
state sovereignty received its most renowned expression in the opinion of
Judge John F. Dillon in City of Clinton v. CedarRapids & MissouriRiver
R.R.16 Dillon's Rule, as the opinion has come to be known, elaborately
stated what had already been widely taken for granted by state legislatures.
The opinion was cited by courts in nearly every state in ruling on challenges
17
to municipal authority.
Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their
powers and rights wholly from, the legislature. It breathes into
them the breath of life, without which they cannot exist. As it
creates, so it may destroy. If it may destroy, it may abridge and
control. 18
The home rule movement ironically had its beginnings shortly after
Dillon's Rule was promulgated.' 9 In response to post-Civil War recognition of the rampant abuse of "special legislation," reformers cried out for
constitutional conventions to remedy the situation. 20 Though the major
13.

R. BRANNING, PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 14-15 (1960). The

Pennsylvania constitution of 1776 gave the General Assembly the power to create and classify
municipalities within the Commonwealth. Selection of local officials was accomplished
largely through appointment by the Executive Council, which served as the executive branch
of the state's government.

14. "The notion that American municipalities have an inherent right to local selfgovernment has never made more than slight inroads upon the strongly prevailing doctrine of
legislative supremacy over local government." Fordham & Asher, Home Rule Powers in
Theory and Practice,9 OHIO ST. L.J. 18, 18 (1948). The doctrine of local self-government was
first judicially asserted in People ex rel. Le Roy v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 44, 92 (1871) (Cooley, J.,
concurring). The opinion, however, never gained popular acceptance and was rejected by the
vast majority of courts. Sandalow, The Limits of MunicipalPower UnderHome Rule: A Role
for the Courts, 48 MINN. L. REV. 643, 646 n.lI (1963-64). SeegenerallyMcBain, The Doctrine
of an Inherent Right of Local Self-Government, 16 COLUM. L. REV. 190 (1916); Eaton, The
Right to Local Self-Government, 13 HARV. L. REV. 441,470, 629 (1899-1900); 14 HARV. L.
REV. 20, 116 (1900-01).

15. Proprietors of the Charles R. Bridge v. Proprietors of the Warren Bridge, 36 U.S.
420 (1837); Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518 (1819); People v. Kerr,
27 N.Y. 188 (1863); Purdy v. People, 4 Hill 384 (N.Y. 1842); People v. Morris, 13 Wend. 325
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1835).
16. 24 Iowa 455 (1868).
17. Hodges, City Tax Collector v. Western Union Tel. Co., 72 Miss. 910, 18 So. 84
(1895); Commissioners of Johnston County v. Lacy, 174 N.C. 141,156,93 S.E. 482,489 (1917)
(dissenting opinion); Portland & W.V. R.R. v. City of Portland, 14 Ore. 188, 12 P. 265 (1886).
Judge Dillon was not cited in Philadelphia v. Fox, 64 Pa. 169 (1870), though the case is
Pennsylvania's counterpart to Clinton.
18. City of Clinton v. Cedar Rapids & Mo. River R.R., 24 Iowa 455,475 (1868). In a later
work Judge Dillon expanded on his view:
It is a general and undisputed proposition of law that a municipal corporation
possesses and can exercise the following powers and no others: First, those granted
in express words; second, those necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the
powers expressly granted; third, those essential to the declared objectives and
purposes of the corporations-not simply convenient but indispensible. Any fair
reasonable doubt concerning the existence of power is resolved by the courts
against the corporation and the power is denied.
J. DILLON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATION 145 (5th ed. 1911).
19. H. JAMES, LOCAII GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 309 (1921).
20. Special legislation is that which affects exclusively aspecifically named municipality. C. ADRIAN & C. PRESS, GOVERNING URBAN AMERICA 75-76 (3d ed. 1968). In Pennsylvania,
the General Assembly was so occupied with dispensing special favors that there was little time
left to deal With problems of state-wide concern. Lobbying for municipal legislation often
required much time and also money to "grease the wheels" that moved the Assembly. R.
BRANNING, PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 43 (1960).

product of the conventions was a ban on special legislation, the concept of
home rule received consideration as a means of ending the political
corruption that was wreaking havoc on municipal governments. 2' It was
hoped that by transferring some power from the state legislatures to local
governments, communities would have an increased voice in the conduct
of their affairs, with increased governmental responsibility as the result.
Constitutional amendments were needed to accomplish this transfer
because of ingrained strict construction against autonomous local government and the reluctance of legislators to relinquish their often lucrative
power. 22 Initially appearing in the constitution of Missouri, 23 amendments
providing for home rule or mandatory enabling legislation have since
found their way into the laws of a majority of states. 24
Pennsylvania's activity in home rule came somewhat late. In 1922 an
amendment to the Pennsylvania constitution permitted the General Assembly to enact home rule legislation. 25 The permissive nature of the amendment had significant implications, for lack of a scheduled deadline left
implementation of the provision entirely to the discretion of the General
Assembly. 26 Confirming the fears that had originally prompted the use of
constitutional amendments, the legislature took some twenty-seven years
to surrender control over local affairs to local authorities-and then it did
so only for cities of the first class. 27 Since Philadelphia is the only "first
class" city in the Commonwealth, the legislature restricted the availability
of home rule far more than the amendment had intended.2 8 The fate of the
1922 amendment highlights the difficulties that may be encountered when
entrusting a legislature with the duty of relieving itself of its powers.
Despite the disinclinations of the General Assembly, the Philadelphia
home rule experience has been relatively successful compared to follies
21.
22.
23.

24.

C. ADRIAN & C. PRESS, GOVERNING URBAN AMERICA 76 (3d ed. 1968).
H. MCBAIN, supra note 4, at 656-56.
Vanlandingham, supra note 4, at 284. The Missouri provision was adopted in 1875.

Sandalow, The Limits ofMunicipal Power UnderHomeRule: A Roleforthe Courts,

48 MINN. L. REV. 643, 645 (1963-64).

25. At the discretion of the legislature, municipalities could be empowered "to frame
and adopt their own charters and to exercise the powers and authority of self-government,
subject, however to such restrictions, limitations, and regulations as may be imposed by the
legislature." H. HARRAL & H. ALDERFER, CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL LIMITATIONS AFFECTING LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN PENNSYLVANIA 37 (1968).
26. Many writers have characterized the permissive-type constitutional amendment
along the following lines:
All of these provisions appear to represent scarcely more than constitutional

authorization for the state legislature to delegate its powers to cities. Under such

provisions, the municipalities' freedom to determine their local affairs depends

solely upon legislative grace. According to one author such freedom is 'comparable

to that of a cow staked out to graze by a chain which may be lengthened or
shortened at will.'
Vanlandingham, supra note 4, at 294-95, citing Merrill, Constitutional Home Rule for

Cities-Oklahoma Version, 5 OKLA. L. REV. 139, 149 (1952).
27. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 13101-13157 (1957 & Supp. 1976-77).
28. The first enabling act bill for state-wide home rule was put before the General
Assembly in 1923. Rural legislators were inclined to favor the home rule bills, but the
"political opposition" of the city machine delegates was able to stall passage. J. CRUMLISH,
A
CITY FINDS ITSELF: THE PHILADELPHIA HOME RULE MOVEMENT 13-14 (1959).

experienced in some states. 9 On January 7, 1952, the act's effective date,
the city quickly seized upon the broad grant of powers section 30 and
exercised authority even beyond that which the courts could have sustained
under the enabling statute .31Some actions of the city were challenged, and
occasionally the city was unsuccessful in defending its interests.3 2 But the
overall advantages gained by seizing as much power as possible far
outweighed the annoyance of intermittent legal challenges. Experimentation and utilization are the keynotes of the Philadelphia experience.
Home rule received little attention in Pennsylvania outside of
Philadelphia until the early 1960's, 33 when local government and home
rule became hotly debated issues within commissions appointed to study
the need for revision of Pennsylvania's constitution. 34 The studies
climaxed in the constitutional convention of 1968, which resulted in
substantial revision of the constitution in general and of provisions on local
government in particular. New language appeared in article IX, section 2,
mandating home rule enabling legislation:
Municipalities shall have the right and power to frame and
adopt home rule charters. . . .The General Assembly shall
provide the procedure by which a home rule charter may be
framed and its adoption, amendment or repeal presented to the
electors. . . .A municipality which has a home rule charter may
exercise any power or perform any function not denied by this
Constitution, by35its home rule charter or by the General Assembly at any time.

In contrast to the 1922 amendment, the new provision was mandatoryin that it self-executed within four years after the adoption of the constitution.36 It became apparent from the dilatory efforts that ensued, however,
29. Id. at 94-95.
30. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 13131 (1957).
31. See, e.g., PA. CODE tit. 351, § 8.8:200(2) (a provision of the Philadelphia Charter
dealing with public bids for city contracts that is not in harmony with the First Class City
Code, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53 § 13372 (1957), and could well have been challenged as beyond
powers of local self-government).
32. See, e.g., Mastrangelo v. Buckley, 433 Pa. 352, 250 A.2d 447 (1969); Cali v. City of
Philadelphia, 406 Pa. 290, 177 A.2d 824 (1962); Repici Estate, 58 Pa. D. & C.2d 576 (1972);
Dist. Council 33 of Am. Fed'n of State, County, and Municipal Employees v. Philadelphia, 55
Pa. D. & C.2d 679 (1971).
33. The Optional Third Class City Charter Law, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 41101-41625
(Supp. 1976-77), was enacted in 1957. It is often construed as conferring home rule powers.
The following provision of the Act fuels the confusion:
The general grant of municipal power contained in this article is intended to
confer the greatest power of local self-government consistent with the Constitution
of this State. . . .All grants of municipal power to cities governed by an optional
plan under this Act, whether in the form of specific enumeration or general terms,
shall be liberally construed in favor of the city.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 41304 (Supp. 1976-77).
The courts seem to have developed a middle-ground approach to the problem; they still
look for statutory authorization but will uphold a challenged exercise of power if it arguably
falls within the provision and is a matter of local self-government. See, e.g., Greenberg v. City
of Bradford, 432 Pa. 611, 248 A.2d 51 (1968).
34. The Woodside Commission on Constitutional Revision published its report and
recommendations in 1959. The Scranton Commission published its report in 1964. The
recommendations of the two commissions were not in complete harmony on the issue of home
rule implementation.
35. PA. CONST. art IX, § 2.
36. A schedule of effective dates for various provisions of the 1968 constitution is
found in PA. CONST. art. IX, Schedule.

that the change in times had not brought a change in the General Assembly's attitude toward relinquishing its powers. Finally on April 13, 1972,
just ten days before the constitutionally scheduled deadline, Act 62 was
signed into law. 37 The Act became effective immediately 38 and shortly
thereafter civic groups and municipal councils began preparations for
submitting the question of convening a study commission to the electorate
in the upcoming fall election. 39 The immediate problem was getting the
charter approved by the voters; only later would officials be confronted
with the problem of what could be done with the charter once approved.
III.

Grant of Power and Limitations Under Act 62

The necessary point of departure for analysis of municipal home rule
under Act 62 is the grant of power provision. 4° The provision is framed in
broad terms connoting a full grant of local autonomy. The substance of the
grant is a nearly verbatim reproduction of the words appearing in article IX,
section 2, of the 1968 Pennsylvania constitution; thus the constitutional
mandate is carried into effect to the letter. 4' The chartered municipality is
given authority to exercise any powers and perform any function not denied
by its home rule charter, by the Pennsylvania constitution, or by the
General Assembly. An essential supplement to the grant of power is the
general limitation provision, 42 which provides for legislative preemption
of home rule powers by statutes of uniform applicability throughout the
Commonwealth. 43
The theoretical bases of Act 62's grant of power and general limitation
sections were not the product of original thought by the constitutional
commissions or by the General Assembly. Rather, they derive from the
rich debate that has taken place since home rule's conception over the best
theoretical approach to local autonomy. The following sections are
37. Act of April 13, 1972, P.L. 184, No. 62 (codified at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 1-101 to
1-1309 (1974 & Supp. 1976-77)).
38. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 1-1309 (1974).
39. The question whether to convene a study commission for purposes of drafting a
home rule charter was placed before the electorate in 70 municipalities in November 1972.
40. This provision reads as follows:
A municipality which has adopted a home rule charter may exercise any
powers and perform any function not denied by the Constitution of Pennsylvania,
by its home rule charter or by the General Assembly at any time. All grants of
municipal power to municipalities governed by a home rule charter under this act,
whether in the form of specific enumeration or general terms, shall be liberally
construed in favor of the municipality.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 1-301 (1974).
41. PA. CONST. art. IX, § 2. This section replaces art. XV, § 1, which was the basis for
the First Class City Charter Act of 1949.
42. Acts of the General Assembly in effect on the effective date of this act that are
uniform and applicable throughout the Commonwealth shall remain in effect and
shall not be changed or modified by this act. Acts of the General Assembly enacted
after the effective date of this act that are uniform and applicable throughout the
Commonwealth shall supersede any municipal ordinance or resolution on the same
subject.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 1-302(c) (1974 & Supp. 1975-76).
43. The general limitation provision will be found accompanying the grant of power in
most constitutions and enabling statutes. See KAN. CONST. art. XII, § 5(b); N.Y. CONST. art.
IX, § 2(c); TEX. CONST. art. XI, §5.

devoted to an overview of the primary theories advanced by scholars and
the relation of those theories to Act 62.
A.

McBain, NML, and the PhiladelphiaCharter

Debates have raged for years over the best method of achieving the
delicate balance between centralized management and local autonomy that
best serves the needs of the people. Beyond accepting the postulate that
home rule is essentially desirable, few authorities agree on how much
home rule power is enough before over-fragmentation and waste of
resources result. 44
H.L. McBain, in his early work on home rule,4 5 advanced a theory
consisting of three basic elements: (1) true home rule is attainable only by
constitutional amendment; (2) "general laws" enacted by the state legislature must remain supreme over inconsistent local ordinances; and (3) to
prevent judicial erosion of home rule powers, a precise enumeration of
powers should be provided in the constitution.46 McBain envisioned strong
municipal governments wielding enumerated powers that could not easily
be stripped away. Local affairs, however, including those related to the
enumerated powers, would be subject to state control to the extent of
47
general state legislation with which local ordinances were inconsistent.
McBain defined general laws to include laws "relating to general or state
concern" and those of "general application.' '48 Thus, the exercise of a
municipality's power over local affairs had to be consonant with general
legislation.
Though not generally associated with the McBain thesis, the original
model state constitution published by the National Municipal League
(NML) 49 incorporates much of McBain's thinking into an imperio in
imperium5 ° approach. The NML model provided for a grant of power over
"local affairs, property and government" with no limitation on the
legislature's power to enact general laws of state-wide concern. 5" Also
included in the broad grant is a specific enumeration of powers and
44. Kenneth Vanlandingham states: "Most students of state and local government
generally consider home rule desirable, but they have never been able to determine satisfactorily either what it should constitute, or what should be the most satisfactory method for
granting it." Vanlandingham, supra note 4, at 283.
45. H. MCBAIN, supra note 4.
46. Id. at 656-84.
47. "General legislation" is not a concept conducive to precise definition. It can mean
anything from merely the opposite of special local legislation, which is entirely prohibited
presently (see PA. CONST. art. III, § 32), to only legislation that is uniformly applicable
state-wide. The context in which the term is used will often determine its meaning.
48. H. MCBAIN, supra note 4, at 677.
49. The National Municipal League's Model State Constitution was first published in
192 1. Though it was revised periodically thereafter, it retained the basic provisions on home
rule until the sixth edition was published in 1963. NATIONAL MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, MODEL
STATE CONSTITUTION (6th ed. 1963).

50. The expression imperio in imperium was first used in St. Louis v. Western Union
Tel. Co., 149 U.S. 465, 468 (1893) (Brewer, J.). It translates literally to "an empire within an
empire" and was used to describe the approach to home rule taken by the Missouri courts in
construing the Missouri constitution, Mo. CONST. art. VI, §§ 18-20.
51. NATIONAL MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, MODEL STATE CONSTITUTION § 8.04 (5th ed. 1948).

52
functions that were "deemed a part of the powers conferred upon cities"
but which could not be exercised in a manner "inconsistent with general
law." 53 Several commentators on the NML imperio in imperium provision
have pointed out what they consider to be ambiguities in the manner in
which the theory is presented. They contend that the provision is paradoxical and inconsistent since, while it makes an unqualified grant of home rule
power over local affairs and property, it also specifically enumerates
certain of those powers and makes them subject to general laws. 54 The
express language of the model provision offers no solution to this paradox.
It is evident that the expression "general laws" is crucial in the
delineation of home rule powers under both the NML and the McBain
theories. The meaning to be attached to the expression, however, was not
clearly defined in either. In states utilizing the "general laws" limitation,
courts have been required to supply meaning to the expression, often
reaching widely divergent results. In construing a similar provision of its
constitution, the Missouri Supreme Court very early held that general laws
were only those dealing with matters of state-wide concern.55 General laws
applicable in every part of a state would not pre-empt home rule power over
their subject matter if they dealt with matters of purely local concern.
Critics of this interpretation charge that the content of home rule powers is
placed too much in the hands of the judiciary. 56 " [P]rovisions. . .require
judicial assignment of governmental functions into state and municipal

categories. .

.

. [A]ssignment of such functions should be made by the

legislature because it involves considerations of public policy." 57 Since
the courts have been regarded by some of those critics as the "bulwark
against home rule," 58 alternative means of enactment were felt necessary.
The Philadelphia home rule enabling act is patterned largely upon the
old NML approach. The phraseology of the general grant of power
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. See Sandalow, The Limits of Municipal Power Under Home Rule: A Role for the
Courts, 48 MINN. L. REV. 643, 651 n.30 (1963-64); Vanlandingham, supra note 4, at 298.
55. City of Kansas City v. Marsh Oil Co., 140 Mo. 458,41 S.W. 943 (1897); State ex rel.
Kansas City v. Field, 99 Mo. 352, 12 S.W. 802 (1889). Pennsylvania cases construing the First
Class City Home Rule Charter Act have adopted an interpretation similar to that of the
Missouri Supreme Court. See notes 61-63 and accompanying text infra, discussing the holding
of the leading case of Lennox v. Clark, 372 Pa. 355, 93 A.2d 834 (1953). Professor Brombage,
who wrote a supplementary article to the NML model constitutional provision, later clarified
its intended meaning by stating that "general laws" referred to laws of state-wide concern
uniformly applicable to every municipality. See Vanlandingham, supra note 4, at 298 n. 148,
This interpretation preserves the imperio in imperium nature of the provision.
On the other side of the spectrum, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has held that the
designation of local affairs is primarily a matter for the legislature's determination. If the
legislature passes an act of uniform applicability, it may be presumed that the matter is of
state-wide concern and that home rule powers are therefore pre-empted. Van Gilder v. City
Of Madison, 222 Wis. 58, 267 N.W. 25 (1936).
56. COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, STATE LOCAL RELATIONS 170 (1946); J. MCGOLDRICK, LAW AND PRACTICE OF MUNICIPAL HOME RULE 1916-1930 at 310-12 (1933); Fordham,

Home Rule-AMA Model, 44 NAT'L MUN. REV. 137, 139 (1955); Walker, Toward a New
Theory of Municipal Home Rule, 50 Nw. U.L. REV. 571, 575-78 (1955).
57. Vanlandingham, supra note 4, at 299 (discussing arguments against the NML model
advanced by its various critics).
58. Walker, Toward a New Theory of MunicipalHome Rule, 50 Nw. U. L. REV. 571,575
(1955).

provision transmitted a clear signal to Pennsylvania courts to begin
dividing governmental functions into a local interest-state concern
dichotomy.5 9 Home rule powers are preempted by state statutes "applicable in every part of the Commonwealth.' 6° The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court has consistently construed this "applicable in every part of the
Commonwealth" provision to encompass only statutes dealing with substantive matters of state-wide concern, such as health, safety, security, and
general welfare of all the inhabitants of the state. 61 This enumeration of
state-wide concerns attempted by the supreme court is the very type of
activity that has enraged critics of the NML approach. In their opinion, a
policy judgment of the legislature should determine the areas of authority
that are to be open to home rule legislation. 62 Nevertheless, the Philadelphia experience, under the guidance and protection of the Pennsylvania
63
Supreme Court, has been a most successful home rule experience.
B.

American Municipal Association Model

Critics of the NML and the McBain theories found their mentor in
Dean Jefferson Fordham of the University of Pennsylvania Law School.
In 1953 Dean Fordham proposed another major approach to home rule
implementation that was adopted by the American Municipal Association
(AMA) 64 as its preferred model. 65 In seemingly unequivocal language, the
Fordham approach reserves all local procedural matters for exclusive home
rule authority. 66 With regard to substantive matters, however, the approach
subordinates home rule authority to any legislative act of general and
uniform application.67 Any powers not pre-empted by uniformly applicable legislation were to be "devolved" upon the municipality. 68 In effect,
this approach leaves the ultimate determination of what substantive powers
are granted to the municipality almost entirely in the hands of the
legislature. 69 It is distinguishable from the NML approach, which granted
59. While the First Class City Home Rule Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 13101-13157
(1957 & Supp. 1976-77), is legislative implementation of home rule, it adopts the same basic
format and underlying theory found in the provisions of the 1948 NML Model Constitution.
60. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 13133(b) (1957).
61. Ebald v. Philadelphia, 387 Pa. 407, 128 A.2d 352 (1957), aff'g on opinion of lower
court 7 Pa. D. & C.2d 179 (1956) (civil service held a matter of local concern); Lennox v.
Clark, 372 Pa. 355, 93 A.2d 834 (1953) (personnel held a matter of local concern); Repici
Estate, 58 Pa. D. & C.2d 576 (1972) (subject matter of Estates and Fiduciaries Code held to be
of state-wide concern).
62. Fordham, Home Rule-AMA Model, 44 NAT'L MUN. REV. 137, 140 (1955).
63. J. CRUMLISH, A CITY FINDS ITSELF; THE PHILADELPHIA HOME RULE MOVEMENT 95
(1959); PENNSYLVANIA ECONOMY LEAGUE, HISTORY OF PHILADELPHIA'S CITY GOVERNMENT
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE HOME RULE CHARTER AND THE EDUCATIONAL SUPPLEMENT
TO CHARTER 9 (1973).

64. The American Municipal Association is presently known as the National League of
Cities. It is referred to herein, however, by its original name (AMA).
65. AMERICAN MUNICIPAL ASSOCIATION, MODEL CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS FOR
MUNICIPAL HOME RULE (1953).

66. Id. § 6.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. This carries out the intent of those who formulated the plan by relieving the courts
of the responsibility of determining the scope of home rule powers and investing it in the
legislature. Home rule powers, under the model, exist strictly by legislative grace.

home rule municipalities power over local affairs. The AMA model
deliberately avoids any language that might be construed as an invitation to
the courts to grant powers they consider to be of local concern. The model
has the distinct advantage of being easy to interpret and highly predictable.70 It avoids lawsuits brought solely to determine in which categorylocal or state-a particular power falls. The model has the distinct
disadvantage of making the legislature the final arbiter of the more vital
municipal powers.7" It ignores both the historic fact that centralized power
in the legislature was the primary motivating force behind the home rule
innovation and the truism that political power, once possessed, is difficult
to dislodge. As one commentator stated, "experience demonstrates, the
state legislature is sometimes an untrustworthy guardian of home rule
72
powers. The AMA model was generally well received following its publicaIn light of the widespread disillusionment with provisions based on
the NML imperio in imperium theory that has resulted from the failure of
home rule at the hands of some courts, it is not difficult to understand the
acceptance of a fresh breath of air. A decade after the adoption of the
Fordham theory by the AMA 74 the NML followed suit by adopting a similar
tion.7 3

plan as its preferred model." 5 The new NML plan discards the local

interest-state concern dichotomy and substitutes the Fordham theory that
home rule municipalities will have all powers not pre-empted by general
laws of uniform application.76 Unlike the Fordham theory, however, the
new NML approach does reserve local procedural matters to home rule
power. Instead, all areas of authority may be legislatively pre-empted by
uniformly applicable laws. 77 This carries the legislative supremacy
approach a step beyond the AMA model and makes home rule power
purely a matter of legislative grace. 78
C.

Act 62: A Hybrid
It has been stated that Act 62 falls "somewhere" between the AMA

70. To determine which powers are conferred by home rule, one need merely determine
which statutes are not applied in every part of the Commonwealth. To the extent that there are
such statutes, independent home rule authority exists in the areas they cover. Of course, it
also exists in areas not covered by any statute.
71. Professor Fordham, author of the AMA Model, has stated that "[t]he model,
significantly, does not put any substantive home rule powers beyond legislative control."
Fordham, Home Rule-AMA Model, 44 NAT'L MUN. REV. 137, 140 (1955).
72. Vanlandingham, supra note 4, at 307.
73. For reactions of some of the leading authorities of the time, see Peterson, Home
Rule-Press View 44 NAT'L. MUN. REV. 143 (1955).
74. AMERICAN MUNICIPAL ASSOCIATION, MODEL CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS FOR
MUNICIPAL HOME RULE (1953).
75. NATIONAL MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, MODEL STATE CONSTITUTION

§§ 8.01-.02 (6th ed.

1963). The imperio in imperium-type model was retained as an alternative.
76. Id. § 8.02.
77. Id. As will be discussed later, the grant of power and its limitations in Act 62
superficially resemble the approach of the new NML model rather than the AMA model in
that Act 62 does not specifically reserve local procedural matters.
78. Vanlandingham, supra note 4, at 306-07.

and the original NML models.7 9 Exactly where it falls is important in
defining the range of home rule powers it grants. The wording of the grant
of power provision 80 conspicuously omits any mention of "local affairs"
or "municipal functions," which under the original NML model 8l and the
Philadelphia act 82 signaled application of the local interest-state concern
criterion to test local legislation. It could be reasoned, therefore, that
Pennsylvania has followed the growing trend away from the judiciaryoriented imperio in imperium approach toward the legislative supremacy
models of the NML and the AMA. 83 Indeed, Act 62's approach closely
resembles that of the new NML model, which is closer to legislative
supremacy and further from imperio in imperiumthan is the AMA model.84
The ways of the past, however, have not been totally discarded. The title of
Act 62 states that it is "[a]n Act giving municipalities the right and power
to adopt home rule charters. . .and to exercise the powers and authority
of local self-government subject to certain restrictions .... ",85 Hence,
while the body of the Act grants all powers not denied by the Pennsylvania
the General Assemconstitution, the municipality's home rule charter, or
87
86 its title flirts with the local-state dichotomy.
bly,
The possible combination of two divergent theories of home rule in
Act 62 complicates prediction of the scope of the home rule powers it
grants. The difficulty lies in attempting to integrate two theories that
provide for mutually exclusive areas of home rule authority. The graph
below illustrates the problem.

79. L. GAMM, J. JAMES, & J. KARLESKY, PENNSYLVANIA LOCAL GOVERNMENTANDTHE
HOME RULE CHARTER AND OPTIONAL PLANS LAW 11-23 (1974).
80. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 1-301 (1974).
81. NATIONAL MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, MODEL STATE CONSTITUTION § 8.04. (5th ed. 1948).
82. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 13131 (1957).
83. The legislative history on this point is inconclusive. While there was apparently no
mention of the NML or AMA approaches in the debates of either house of the General
Assembly, there is an oblique statement by Senator Madahy that the senate version of the Act
contained language that permits the legislature "at any time [to] consider, even home rule
people, under the same category as we now legislate for third class cities, we could legislate
for home rule charter people." [1972] LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL, SENATE 1287. This statement
might be taken to confirm the use of the AMA approach.
84. One of the major differences between the home rule plans of these two
national organizations lies in the degree of home rule granted: the new NML model
subjects home rule in both its procedural and substantive aspects to legislative
control, while the [AMA] model grants virtually complete home rule in the
procedural area.
Vanlandingham, supra note 4, at 299.
85. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 1-101 (1974) (Historical Note: Title of Act) (emphasis
added). The title was read aloud many times during the debates of both houses of the General
Assembly. See [1972] LEGIS. J.,SENATE 1285; [1972] LEGIS. J., HOUSE 2527.
86. This grant of power closely resembles that of the AMA model. AMERICAN MUNICI.
PAL ASSOCIATION, MODEL CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS FOR MUNICIPAL HOME RULE (1953).

87.

This grant of power closely resembles that of the original NML model (utilized in

the Philadelphia charter act). NATIONAL MUNICIPAL LEAGUE MODEL STATE CONSTITUTION

(5th ed. 1948).
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CONCERN

A superficial reading of the grant of power and "uniform and
applicable" provisions of Act 6288 might lead to the conclusion that it
follows the AMA model, granting only quandrant II and IV powers; but
ambiguity of legislative intent will require that courts supply a clarifying
construction. In this regard, extensive Pennsylvania case law construing
the Philadelphia imperio in imperium approach will not likely go unnoticed
in comparing two acts of such similar import and subtle distinction. Thus
cases dealing with the Philadelphia charter provide useful guidance in
determining the scope of home rule powers under Act 62.
In its construction of the Philadelphia charter, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court has broadly defined the concept of "local interest."
Lennox v. Clark89 confines applicability of the limitation subjecting home
rule to "acts of the General Assembly

.

. .applicable in every part of the

Commonwealth"' to acts that deal with substantive matters of state-wide
concern. 9 Lennox has often been cited for the proposition that the
local-state dichotomy, as determined by the court, may not be legislatively
encroached upon merely by a law of general application. 92 The case
provides significant precedent that cannot be overlooked in construing
limitations on the grant of power in Act 62. If prior Pennsylvania case law
is a basis for prediction, the home rule municipality will have power over
88. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 1-301, 1-302 (1974 & Supp. 1976-77).
89. 372 Pa. 355, 93 A.2d 834 (1953).
90. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 13133(b) (1957).
91. [l~t [is] abundantly clear that the limitations of power referred to in [§ 13133(b)
of the Philadelphia Act) concern only laws in relation to substantive matters of
State-wide concern, such as health, safety, security and general welfare of all the
inhabitants of the State, and not to matters affecting merely [local interests]...
and which are of no concern to citizens elsewhere. Any other conclusion would
reduce the Charter to a mere scrap of paper and make the much heralded grant of
Philadelphia home rule an illusion and a nullity.
Lennox v. Clark, 372 Pa. 355, 379, 93 A.2d 834, 845 (1953).
92. Bartle v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 391 Pa. 207, 137 A.2d 239 (1958), aff'g on
opinion of lower court 10 Pa. D. & C.2d 613,619(1957); Ebald v. Philadelphia, 387 Pa. 407, 128
A.2d 352 (1957), aff'g on opinion of lowercourt7 Pa. D. & C.2d 179, 182 (1956); In reAddison,
385 Pa. 48, 55, 122 A.2d 272, 274 (1956). An act concerning essentially local matters must
specifically include home rule municipalities under its provisions to pre-empt home rule
powers. Alternatively, the legislature's intent to pre-empt the area of local concern may be
included in the enumerated list of limitations.

all subjects directly related to local interests. On the graph above, this
would include all powers in quadrants III and IV. General laws dealing
with purely local concerns are superseded by home rule powers notwithstanding uniform applicability. The proper recourse for the legislature,
should it desire to pre-empt an area of local interest, is to do so expressly by
including it in the list of express limitations.
Quadrant II powers are those of state-wide concern that are not
covered by uniform statutes of state-wide application. Under a pure
legislative supremacy approach such as the new NML model, home rule
municipalities are permitted to exercise all powers, state or local in nature,
that are not covered by uniformly applicable legislation or otherwise
denied.9 3 Act 62 contains a broad grant of authority over matters not
covered by uniformly applicable state legislation or otherwise denied by
the municipality's home rule charter, the Pennsylvania constitution, or the
General Assembly. 94 This type of grant anticipates municipalities entering
areas primarily of state concern, as well as areas of local concern, to deal
with problems that affect the municipalities, but which might otherwise go
unremedied if the municipalities wait for state legislation. 95 Quadrant II
powers are subject to pre-emption from home rule authority to the extent
that the legislature enacts statutes of uniform application. 9 6 Since legislation that affects only a class or certain classes of municipalities is not
uniformly applicable, classification by population in matters of state
concern could be utilized only after the subject is pre-empted by express
97
limitation.
The blending of divergent theories in Act 62 actually results in a
combination of the powers granted under each. The home rule municipality
gains power over (1) all local matters, and (2) matters primarily of state
concern that have not been legislated upon by uniformly applicable laws.
There appears to be no valid objection to this broad interpretation of home
rule authority; it is supported by the grant of power provision, the title of
the Act, and Pennsylvania case law. To the extent that certainty is added to
the ascertainment of powers granted, the broad approach is welcome
assistance. 9 8 The legislature is in no way limited in dealing with state
concerns, as long as it acts with some cognizance that home rule exists
when it wishes to apply laws by classification. 99 The occasional prohibi93. NATIONAL MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, MODEL STATE CONSTITUTION § 8.02 (6th ed. 1963).
94. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 1-301, 1-302(c) (1974 & Supp. 1976-77).
95. NATIONAL MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, MODEL STATE CONSTITUTION § 8.02 (6th ed. 1963).
96. Vanlandingham, supra note 4, at 307. Note that even quadrant IV powers under the
complete legislative supremacy model are subject to pre-emption by uniform legislation
leaving essentially no areas of home rule power.
97. Id. at 307.
98. Furthermore, Act 62 mandates that all grants of home rule power under the act be
liberally construed in favor of the municipality. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 1-301 (1974).

99. In taking cognizance of the existence of home rule, the General Assembly should
make specific reference to the status of home rule municipalities in the particular statute. See,
e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 6780-8 (Supp. 1976-77) (specifically referring to the status of
home rule municipalities). This approach greatly clarifies the range of home rule powers.

tions against Philadelphia's entrance into matters of state concern 1°° are of
no consequence-the grant of power under the Philadelphia act was only
for powers and functions of local self-government rather than the broader
grant of all powers not otherwise denied that is found in Act 62.101
Furthermore, the flexibility gained by allowing the home rule municipality
to deal expeditiously with problems normally of state concern but that pose
a direct threat to the municipality does much to commend the broad
interpretation.10 2 Taking into account the unique Pennsylvania situation, 103 the most advantageous way to integrate the two theories is actually
to combine the powers granted by both. In this manner the much-heralded
grant of home rule powers will not become an "illusion and a nullity." 104
D.

Other Avenues of Pre-emption

Discussion in the preceding section centers primarily on the
"uniformly applicable" and the "state-wide concern" methods of preempting home rule powers. Only brief mention has been made of two other
avenues available to the General Assembly to reserve areas of authority to
itself: (1) the express limitation subdivisions of the Act; 10 5 and (2)
legislative intent concerning municipal activity in an area covered by
statute. A comprehensive examination of home rule power under Act 62 is
not possible without thorough consideration of these two additional
limitations.
A survey of the limitation section of Act 62 reveals sixteen express
prohibitions on home rule authority. 10 The opening paragraph, which lists
100. Commonwealth ex rel. Specter v. Freed, 424 Pa. 508, 228 A.2d 382 (1967); Repici
Estate, 58 Pa. D. & C.2d 576 (1972).
101. Compare the language of the grant of power under the First Class City Charter Act,
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 13131 (1957), with the grant in Act 62, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 1-301
(1974).
102. The municipality can take the initiative in confronting emerging urban problems
until the General Assembly can enact state-wide policy.
103. No other state has two home rule charter acts in force applying the two divergent
theories of home rule.
104. Lennox v. Clark, 372 Pa. 355, 379, 93 A.2d 834, 845 (1953).
105. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 1-302 (1974 & Supp. 1976-77).
106. The following limitations are included in § 1-302(a) of the Act (paraphrased):
(1) filing and collection of municipal tax claims or liens, and sale of real or
personal property in satisfaction of such claims or liens;
(2) eminent domain procedures and assessment of damages for property taken;
(3) boundary changes of municipalities;
(4) regulation of public schools;
(5) registration of electors and conduct of elections;
(6) fixing subjects of taxation;
(7) fixing rates of nonproperty or personal taxes levied upon nonresidents;
(8) assessment of persons and of real or personal property for taxation
purposes;
(9) defining or providing for the punishment of any felony or misdemeanor;
and
(10) planning and zoning.
Limitations found in other subdivisions of § 1-302 include the following (paraphrased):
(1) engaging in any proprietary or private business unless authorized to do so
by the General Assembly [§ 1-302(b)(i)];
(2) diminishing the rights of any former municipal employee entitled to benefits
or of any present municipal employee in the pension or retirement system [§
1-302(b)(iii)];

ten such subjects, states that "this act shall not give any power or authority
to the municipality contrary to, or in limitationor enlargementof powers
granted by acts of the General Assembly which are applicable to a class or
classes of municipalities on . . . [enumerated] subjects ....

,107 The

thrust of this language is that no home rule municipality may enact an
ordinance that deviates from the statutory authorization relating to the
subjects listed. The subject may be dealt with by a statute that is applicable
to a class or classes of municipalities or one that is uniformly applicable
state-wide; but in either case, the municipality may not legislate in the
subject area unless its ordinance is entirely consistent with the statutory
authorization. 08 The home rule municipality reverts to the status of a
noncharter municipality in these specified areas of authority. Additional or
supplementary legislation will be upheld as valid, despite the "or enlargement of" clause quoted above, to the extent that a general grant of authority
can be found in the codes or other statutes 1°9 and the "field" has not been
pre-empted.l l0 All express prohibitions in Act 62 are in the nature of
subject pre-emption.' 11
These express limitations are the most concrete and determinative
criteria that can be employed in ascertaining areas pre-empted from home
rule authority. The courts have encountered few problems when construing
12
similar express limitations in the Philadelphia Home Rule Charter Act. 1
With Act 62, however, the General Assembly has seen fit to add to the
limitations expressed in the earlier act.1 13 Municipalities must recognize
this decision of the legislature to pre-empt new areas of authority.
(3) enactment of any provision inconsistent with any state statute affecting the
rights, benefits, or working conditions of any municipal employee [§ 1-302(b)(v)];
(4) enactment of any provision dealing with regulation of the transfer, ownership, transportation, or possession of firearms [§ 1-302(e)];
(5) determination of duties, responsibilities, or requirements placed upon
businesses, occupations, and employers [§ 1-302(d)]; and
(6) enactment of any provisions regulating standards of food, goods, or
services subject to Commonwealth laws [N1-302(b)(iv)].
The more controversial of these prohibitions will be discussed below.
107. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 1-302(a) (1974 & Supp. 1976-77) (emphasis added).
108. Similar language, which has been construed to forbid any inconsistent local
legislation, is found in the limitations provision of the First Class City Charter Act. PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 53, § 13133 (1957). SeeCommonwealth v. Ray, 218 Pa. Super. Ct. 72, 272 A.2d 275
(1970), vacated on other grounds, 448 Pa. 307, 292 A.2d 410 (1972).
109. A home rule municipality may exercise any powers granted by acts of the General
Assembly and still be consistent with the express prohibitions. For example, second class
cities that adopt home rule charters may fully regulate standards of foods, goods, and services
to the extent authorized by the broad grant of power found in Second Class City Code: "To
make regulations to secure the general health of the inhabitants, and to remove and prevent
nuisances." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 23145 (1957).
110. For a discussion of field pre-emption, see notes 119-21 and accompanying text
infra.
Ill. The express limitations of Act 62 do not indicate an intent on the part of the General
Assembly to pre-empt the field for the enumerated subjects. In view of the fact that non-home
rule municipalities are free to enact additional or supplemental legislation, the conclusion
must be reached that Act 62's limitations entail only subject pre-emption from home rule
powers. See generally Western Pa. Restaurant Ass'n. v. City of Pittsburgh, 366 Pa. 374, 77
A.2d 616 (1951).
112. See, e.g., Vitacolonna v. City of Philadelphia, 382 Pa. 399, 115 A.2d 178 (1955);
Commonwealth v. Ray, 218 Pa. Super. Ct. 72, 272 A.2d 275 (1970), vacated on othergrounds,
448 Pa. 307, 292 A.2d 410 (1972).
113. Act 62 adds seven new areas of expressjprohibition, the most notable of which is the
limitation on planning and zoning. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 1-302(a)(10) (Supp. 1976-77).

The other possible avenue of pre-emption is through legislative intent
as manifested in a particular statute. 114 This method is closely related to the
"uniformly applicable" and "state-wide concern" methods of preemption, but can extend to areas that would not otherwise be affected
without an expression of intent to limit home rule authority. The proposition has been stated above that under Act 62 home rule municipalities have
power to act in areas of purely local interest even if there are inconsistent
general laws of uniform application. 115 This proposition must be qualified,
however, by pre-emption of home rule authority when an express or
otherwise clear intent to pre-empt is manifested in a statute." 6 This
qualification applies regardless of the nature, state or local, of the area of
authority. Pre-emption by the express intent of statutes that are not
uniformly applicable state-wide is probably possible with regard to
17
subjects of purely local concern as well as those of state-wide interest. 1 If
an express intent is manifested to pre-empt home rule authority, this can be
interpreted as the equivalent of one of the express limitations listed in Act
62.118 Quite often, unfortunately, the intention to pre-empt is not voiced in
any appropriate location. Of course, consistency and ease in identifying
pre-empted subjects are sacrificed when the General Assembly pursues this
technique, but legislative bodies are not known for their consistency or for
their desire to make law easy to locate.
Care must be taken when reading decisions construing legislative
intent to distinguish between two types of intent relevant to the inquiry: (1)
intent to pre-empt topics or the subject covered by an act;" 9 and (2) intent
to pre-empt the field covered by an act. Topic and subject pre-emption
occur by any of the four avenues previously discussed, "state concern,"
"uniformly applicable" legislation, express limitation, or legislative
intent, and are most often associated with home rule pre-emption. Field
pre-emption, on the other hand, is relevant in cases not concerning home
rule as well as in home rule cases. Field pre-emption occurs when the
legislature intends to forbid all classes and types of municipalities from
enacting additional or supplementary legislation on a subject, notwith114. D. Powell, Applicability of Statutes to Pennsylvania Home Rule Municipalities,
68-69 (1973) (unpublished thesis presented to faculty of Wharton School, Univ. of Pa.).
115. See notes 89-98 and accompanying text supra.
116. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 6780-8 (Supp. 1976-77) (pre-empting subjects
covered by the Local Government Unit Debt Act from home rule powers). To prevent erosion
of home rule powers by mere implication, the liberal construction clause requires a clear
expression of intent to pre-empt. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 1-301 (1974). See Warren v. City of
Philadelphia, 382 Pa. 380, 115 A.2d 218 (1955); Comment, The California City versus
Pre-emption by Implication, 17 HASTINGS L.J. 603 (1966).
117. On the graph presented in the preceding section, this includes powers located in
quadrants II and IV.
118. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 1-302 (1974 & Supp. 1976-77).
118.

PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §1-302 (1974 & Supp. 1976-77).

119. There is an important distinction between "topic" and "subject" pre-emption.
Topic pre-emption occurs when the pre-empting statute covers only a limited aspect of a
larger subject. Other topics within the subject covered by other statutes may remain open to
home rule powers. Subject pre-emption occurs when the pre-empting statute or express
limitation covers all aspects of a particular subject: no topic remains open to home rule
powers.

standing any residual powers they may claim to possess from some other
source. 120 Field pre-emption can easily be confused with the pre-emption
of home rule powers, and the courts have been less than clear in distinguishing between ordinary and home rule municipalities when applying the
principle. 2'1 Awareness of this conceptual framework will save much time
in sifting through the case law of pre-emption by legislative intent.
These two additional avenues of pre-emption of home rule powers
often work in conjunction with other methods of pre-emption; none of
them is an exclusive test. Practical application of the tests is illustrated in
the following discussion, in which various areas of governmental concern
are analyzed in the context of powers granted under Act 62.
IV.
A.

Areas of Home Rule Authority Under Act 62
Local Administrative Powers

1. Government Structure.-Act 62 confers wide latitude upon
home rule charter municipalities to fashion a government of their own
choosing. Prior to passage of the Act, the General Assembly exercised
complete control over the form of government available to Pennsylvania
municipalities. The municipal codes provided one form of government in
each classification and every municipality within that class was required to
operate under the prescribed form. For example, until the passage of the
Optional Third Class City Charter Act of 1957,122 cities of the third class
were permitted to use only the commission form of government. 23 The
advantages realized in state-wide consistency were more than offset by the
inefficiencies and ineffectiveness of the commission form of government
in cities in which it was ill-suited to local conditions. 124 Act 62 eliminates
the rigidity of the municipal codes by offering flexible alternatives to
municipalities that adopt a home rule charter.
There is no limitation on the form of government that home rule
municipalities can adopt. 25 The Act permits a home rule municipality to
120. Western Pa. Restaurant Ass'n. v. City of Pittsburgh, 366 Pa. 374, 77 A.2d 616
(1951).
121. Further confusion has resulted from misinterpretation of the significance of field
pre-emption in the context of Pennsylvania home rule. SeeD. Powell, supranote 114, at 69-70.
In states in which virtually every municipality is given home rule powers, e.g., California,
CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 11; New York, N.Y. CONST. art IX, § 2, field pre-emption works
exclusively on home rule powers and is thus more significant to home rule. For a discussion of
field pre-emption in one such state, see Comment, California City vs. Preemption by
Implication, 17 HASTINGS L.J. 603, 605-07 (1966).
122. Act of July 15, 1957, P.L. 901, No. 399.
123. J. KARLESKY, HOME RULE AND OPTIONAL PLANS: A GUIDE FOR PENNSYLVANIANS 69
(1972).
124. An indication of the unpopularity of the commission form of government is found in
the statistic that since adoption of the Optional Third Class City Charter Act of 1957, a full
one-third (16 of 48) of Pennsylvania's third class cities have taken advantage of the opportunity to change their form of government in addition to those adopting home rule or optional plan
charters under Act 62. Pa. Dept. Of Community Affairs, Table of Statistics on Home Rule and
Optional Plan Laws (July 1, 1976).
125. The optional plan segment of Act 62, which is a nonhome rule portion permitting
government reorganization, provides only six alternative structures from which to choose.
PA. STAT. ANN, tit. 53, §§ 1-501 to 1-1102 (1974 & Supp. 1976-77). The six alternative plans are:

choose any one of a number of available forms and mold it to meet the
needs of the community. 126 The only apparent limitation is that accommodation must be made for popular election or at least some municipal
officials.'1 27 Although no provision of Act 62 requires election of municipal
officials, 128 it could hardly have been the intent of the legislature to permit
the creation of autocratic monarchies, ruling politburos, or the like, with no
accountability to the public will. Of course it is highly unlikely that a study
commission would recommend such a plan to the electorate, and equally
unlikely that the plan would be adopted if recommended. Difficulties with
this interpretation are thus not likely to be encountered.
2. Personnel.-Disability benefits, 129 pay scales, 130 and other
issues 13 1 related to the rights and duties of municipal employees have
received thorough scrutiny in Pennsylvania in the context of powers
conferred by Philadelphia's Home Rule Charter Act and to some extent by
the 1957 Third Class City Optional Charter Law. The courts have almost
uniformly held that the qualifications, rights, and benefits of municipal
personnel are matters of purely local concern 132 and are therefore within
(1) Executive (Mayor)-Council Plan A (Department of Administration is
optional).
(2) Executive (Mayor)-Council Plan B (Department of Administration is
mandatory).
(3) Executive (Mayor)-Council Plan B (provides for the office of managing
director).
(4) Council-Manager Plan.
(5) Small Municipality Plan (population of 5000 or less).
(6) Optional County Plan.
The home rule provisions of Act 62 make no reference to the optional forms. This implies
that all forms are available to the home rule municipality.
126. The interpretation that the home rule provisions confer the power to alter the
existing form of government is not likely to be challenged judicially. Article IX, § 2 of the
Pennsylvania constitution gives the municipality the right and power to frame and adopt home
rule charters. The power to alter the structure of local government is generally considered
inherent in the adoption of a home rule charter. Fordham & Asher, supra note 14, at 46.
127. J. KARLESKY, HOME RULE AND OPTIONAL PLANS: A GUIDE FOR PENNSYLVANIANS 70
(1972).
If a county government is to be restructured, provision must also be made for maintaining
state functions now accomplished by county row offices. County powers under Act 62 are not
dealt with in this comment.
128. There are, however, repeated references to such elections made under the assumption that they will take place. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 1-213(b)(c) (1974 & Supp.
1976-77).
129. Ebald v. Philadelphia, 387 Pa. 407, 128 A.2d 352 (1957), aff'g on opinion of lower
court 7 Pa. D. & C.2d 179 (1956); City of Philadelphia v. Hays, 13 Pa. Commw. Ct. 621, 320
A.2d 406 (1974); District Council 33 of Am. Fed'n of State County and Municipal Employees
v. Philadelphia, 55 Pa. D. & C.2d 679 (1971).
130. Greenberg v. City of Bradford, 432 Pa. 611, 248 A.2d 51 (1968).
131. Cali v. City of Philadelphia, 406 Pa. 290, 177 A.2d 824 (1962) (interim election of
mayor); In re Addison, 385 Pa. 48, 122 A.2d 272 (1956) (review of discharge); Civil Serv.
Comm'n v. Eckles, 376 Pa. 421, 103 A.2d 761 (1954) (review of demotion); Tate v. Antosh, 3
Pa. Commw. Ct. 144, 281 A.2d 192 (1971) (grievance procedures); Philadelphia Civil Serv.
Comm'n v. Connolly, I Pa. D. & C.2d 399 (1953) (review of discharge).
132. Greenberg v. City of Bradford, 432 Pa. 611, 248 A.2d51 (1968), Ebald v. Philadelphia, 387 Pa. 407, 128 A.2d 352 (1957), aff'g on opinion of lower court 7 Pa. D. & C.2d 179
(1956); Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Eckles, 376 Pa. 421, 103 A.2d 761 (1954). Accord, State ex rel.
Frankenstein v. Hillenbrand, 100 Ohio St. 339, 126 N.E. 309 (1919). In Citizens Committee to
Recall Rizzo v. Board of Elections, Nos. 89, 90 (Pa. Sup. Ct., Jan. Term, 1977), the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held the recall provision of Philadelphia's Home Rule Charter
unconstitutional under Article VI, Section 7 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, in that it failed
to provide for removal on reasonable cause. Methods of removing legislatively-created or
charter-created officers may be determined by the home rule municipality, however, if the
reasonable cause and due process guidelines set by the court are complied with.

the powers of home rule municipalities under charters of the imperio in
imperium variety, such as Philadelphia's. 133 In jurisdictions that employ
the "uniformly applicable" test for legislative pre-emption under the
AMA model, the courts generally apply the test with rigidity and hold that
the legislature pre-empts authority over municipal personnel if it acts by
34
legislation of uniform statewide applicability.
While the case law construing home rule powers over qualifications
and rights of municipal personnel is informative of the disposition of the
courts, it does not negate what the legislature has provided by express
language in Act 62. The Act states that no municipality shall "enact any
provision inconsistent with any statute heretofore enacted by the General
Assembly affecting the rights, benefits or working conditions of any
employe of a political subdivision of the Commonwealth." 135 The consistency requirement, as expressed in this clause, is a common form of
limitation on home rule powers. In other states that employ the same
terminology, courts have broadly construed the consistency requirement to
convey the same general import as the phrase "contrary to, or in limitation
or enlargement of.' ' 136 This section of Act 62 contains no additional
requirement that the statute of the General Assembly affecting rights,
benefits, or working conditions of municipal personnel be uniformly
applicable state-wide. 137 As a result, the municipal codes and the General
Municipal Law remain controlling over municipalities in these areas and
38
the municipalities revert to non-home rule status with respect to them. 1
The remaining issue is the intended scope of the express limitation on
home rule power over "rights, benefits or working conditions" of municipal employees. 139 A rule of statutory construction requires that words used
in a statute be given their common and ordinary meaning. "4The words
''rights, benefits or working conditions" in the limitation, while broad in
the usual legal sense, do not include such things as functions and duties of
133. See Barclay, Home Rule Powers andthe Civil Service, 36NIMLOMUN. L. REV. 288
(1973).
134. Schryver v. Schirmer, 84 S.D.352, 171 N.W.2d 634 (1969).
135. PA. STAT. ANN. tit, 53, § 1-302(b)(v) (1974). Section 1-302(b)(iii) denies home rule
municipalities "the power to diminish the rights or privileges of any former municipal
employe entitled to benefits or any present municipal employe in his pension or retirement
system."
136. Agnew v. City of Los Angeles, 110 Cal. App. 2d 612, 243 P.2d 73 (1952); City of
Shreveport v. Provenza, 231 La. 514, 91 So. 2d 777 (1956); City of Bellingham v. Schampera,
57 Wash. 2d 106, 356 P.2d 292 (1960).
137. Absence of the uniformly applicable requirement allows pre-emption of home rule
powers by legislation that is applicable to a single class or to certain classes of municipalities.
This forfeits the "safety in numbers" advantage that accompanies the uniformly applicable
provisions. Vanlandingham, supra note 4, at 294.
138. To the extent they relate to rights, benefits or working conditions of municipal
employees; to rights or privileges of any former municipal employee entitled to benefits; or to
any present municipal employee in his pension or retirement system, the following statutes
pre-empt home rule rule powers: PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 23401-23666, 30451-30523,
35901-35917, 37101-37108, 65501-65599 (1957), §§ 46101-46199, 53251-53277 (1966 & Supp.
1976-77), §§ 551-871 (1974).
139. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 1-392(b)(v) (1974).
140. Commonwealth ex rel. Varonne v. Cunningham, 365 Pa. 68, 73 A.2d 705 (1950);
Lehigh & Wilkes-Barre Coal Co. v. Riley, 297 Pa. 522, 147 A. 605(1929); In reFox Film Corp.,
295 Pa. 461, 145 A. 514 (1929); Grayson v. Aiman, Inc., 252 Pa. 461, 97 A. 695 (1916).

employees. 141 To the extent that the functions and duties of municipal
employees are of purely local concern, home rule powers supersede
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When
conflicting state statutes regardless of uniformity of application.
the duties and functions of municipal employees are of state-wide concern,
home rule powers are pre-empted to the extent that the state regulation is
embodied in uniform legislation applicable throughout the Common43
wealth. 1
3. Procedure.-Powerover procedural aspects of municipal functions is another area of local administrative authority affected by adoption
of a home rule charter. If a primary power is within home rule authority,
regulation of the procedural aspects of its exercise should be as well. 1'By
this reasoning, any procedural matters relating to issues of local concern
would be included within a general grant of the power of local selfgovernment. To the extent that courts construe Act 62 as conferring powers
of local self-government, and all indicators suggest that they will, 145 home
rule municipalities will gain power over local procedural matters. All
statutes and municipal codes on these topics are superseded by the grant of
home rule regardless of the uniformity of their application. "46 This conclusion is crucial in light of article IX, section 1, of the Pennsylvania
constitution, which requires that "general law shall be uniform as to all
classes of local government regarding procedural matters." 14 7 When and if
the legislature finally enacts a uniform procedure law,' 48 provisions
governing the exercise of powers characterized as local in nature should not
control home rule municipalities. A contrary interpretation would severely
castrate the grant of substantive powers since independent exercise of
authority would be difficult within the confines of a state-regulated
49
procedure code. 1
In a similar vein, provisions of the Local Agency Law,' 50 which
establish procedures for local agencies analogous to those provided in the
federal Administrative Procedure Act,15 1 have been held to supersede
152
home rule powers over rights of appeal from administrative agencies.
141.

Lake Shore & M.S. Ry. v. Kurtz, 10 Ind. App. 60,37 N.E. 303(1894); McDonald v.

Bayard Say. Bank, 123 Iowa 413, 98 N.W. 1025 (1904).
142.

An exhaustive listing of municipal code provisions dealing with functions and duties

of municipal employees that are of purely local concern is beyond the scope of this comment.
An example, however, may be found at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 735 (1974) (powers of
auxiliary policemen).
143.

E.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 736 (1974) (emergency assignment of police from

other municipalities).
144. Fordham & Asher, supra note 14, at 46.
145.

See notes 98-102 and accompanying text supra.

146. Cf. Bartle v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 391 Pa. 207, 137 A.2d 239 (1958), aff'g on
opinion of lower court 10 Pa. D. & C.2d 613 (1957); In re Addison, 385 Pa. 48, 122 A.2d 272
(1956); Lennox v. Clark, 372 Pa. 355, 93 A.2d 834 (1953).
147. PA. CONST. art. IX, § 1.
148. There was a four year scheduled deadline for the enactment of the uniform
procedure law. PA. CONST. art. IX, Schedule. The General Assembly failed to meet the
deadline. For a discussion of thepossible effects of the failure to adopt a uniform procedure
law on home rule powers over procedure, see D. Powell, supra note 114, at 55-59.

149.

Fordham & Asher, supra note 14, at 46.

150.
151.

53, §§ 11301-11311 (1972).
PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 706-06 (1970).

152.

The Local Agency Law provision on disposition of appeals, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53,

Home rule power has been pre-empted because the right of appeal is dealt
with by superior constitutional provisions. 153 It is difficult to determine
whether sections of the Local Agency Law not pertaining to rights of
appeal will also be held to supersede home rule powers. The Law is
uniformly applicable state-wide and has been treated in cases construing
the Philadelphia Home Rule Charter as dealing with a matter of state-wide
concern. 154 It could be argued that the administrative law provisions of the
Local Agency Law are distinguishable from all other procedural regulations, but perhaps a better explanation of the cases is that each provision of
the Local Agency Law deals with judicial aspects of agency procedure:
since powers of the judiciary are matters of state-wide concern,1 55 any
uniformly applicable statutory provisions dealing with judicial powers
pre-empt home rule powers under Act 62. Thus home rule municipalities
chartered under Act 62 cannot enact procedures contrary to the Local
Agency Law.
B.

Substantive Powers

To this point, discussion has focused on powers of local administration under Act 62, but few problems are encountered in this area, even
when the municipality exercises a full range of independently authorized
administrative powers. Case law is sparse and predictions on pre-emption
are necessarily speculative.' 56 The exercise of substantive home rule
powers, on the other hand, has been plagued with legal challenges and
furnishes an abundant source of precedent. The crucial substantive powers
are discussed below.
1. Planning and Zoning.-Historically, municipal control over
planning and zoning has been considered sacrosanct among the grants of
power under home rule. 157 Zoning is a common exercise of the police
§ 11308 (1972), was held to supersede home rule powers in Harrington v. Civil Serv. Comm'n,
4 Pa. Commw. Ct. 580, 287 A.2d 912 (1972).
153. PA. CONST. art. V, § 9, provides that "there shall also be a. right of appeal from a
court of record or from an administrative agency to a court of record or to an appelllate court
....
, Home rule powers are unquestionably subordinate to provisions of the Pennsylvania
constitution. PA. CONST. art. IX, § 2; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 1-301 (1974).
154. City of Philadelphia v. Evans, 14 Pa. Commw. Ct. 293, 320 A.2d 418 (1974)
(construing § 6 of the Local Agency Law); City of Philadelphia v. Collins, 13 Pa. Commw. Ct.
643, 320 A.2d 421 (1974) (construing § 7 of the Local Agency Law); City of Philadelphia v.
Murphy, 13 Pa. Commw. Ct. 272, 320 A.2d 440 (1974) (construing § 8 of the Local Agency
Law); Robeson v. Philadelphia Tax Rev. Bd., 13 Pa. Commw. Ct. 513, 319 A.2d 201 (1974)
(construing § 4 of the Local Agency Law).
155. PA. CONST. art. V, § I states:
The judicial power of the Commonwealth shall be vested in a unified judicial
system consisting of the Supreme Court, the Superior Court, the Commonwealth
Court, courts of common pleas, community courts, municipal and traffic courts in
the city of Philadelphia, such other courts as may be provided by law and justices of
the peace.
The "by law" provision in the constitution refers to laws of the General Assembly.
Commonwealth v. Zephon, 8 Watts & Serg. 382 (Pa. 1844); Commonwealth v. Flanagan, 7
Watts & Serg. 68 (Pa. 1844). See also Fordham & Asher, supra note 14, at 29-31.
156. Predictions are speculative not only because of the sparse case law construing the
Philadelphia Charter but also because existing case law construes agrant of power that differs
from the grant under Act 62. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 13131 (1957).
157. Fordham & Asher, supra note 14, at 66.

power, and both it 158 and planning 59 are generally characterized as
functions of local self-government. Home rule charters of most cities
outside Pennsylvania provide for planning commissions or other means to
carry out the developmental dictates of city councils.160 Philadelphia was
given absolute authority to regulate planning and zoning by its grant of
power under the First Class City Charter Act, 16 1 and it has enjoyed
tremendous success in sustaining that authority against challenges to
ordinances passed pursuant to the Charter that are inconsistent with the
First Class City Code. 162 No state denies its home rule municipalities the
power to plan and zone' 63 -no state, that is, except Pennsylvania.
Act 62 forbids municipalities to exercise any authority in municipal
planning and zoning. 16' Provisions of the Pennsylvania Municipalities
Planning Code' 65 pre-empt, by authority of Act 62, home rule powers over
their subject matter. The scope of the Planning Code is clarified by its
specific repealer clause. 16 This section repeals all statutory planning and
zoning provisions except those found in the First Class City Code, which
were already superseded by the Philadelphia Home Rule Charter, 167 and
those in the Second Class City Code. Since the Planning Code comprehensively covers the planning and zoning of municipalities other than those of
the first and second class, 168 nearly the entire subject is pre-empted from
home rule power. 169 The City of Pittsburgh, as a second class city, is not
included in the jurisdiction of the Planning Code and is permitted to zone
on its own authority. 70 For cities of the third class, an interesting
inconsistency exists between cities that adopt home rule under Act 62 and
those that adopt an optional charter under the 1957 Optional Plan Law.
Optional plan cities enjoy home rule powers in planning and zoning' 7' and
158. School Dist. of Philadelphia v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 417 Pa. 277,207 A.2d 864
(1965); Bartle v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 391 Pa. 207 137 A.2d 239(1958), afg on opinion
of lower court 10 Pa. D. & C.2d 613 (1957); Heroelin v. Greenberg, 16 Pa. Commw. Ct. 405,
328 A.2d 552 (1974); City of Philadelphia v. Angelone, 3 Pa. Commw. Ct. 119, 280 A.2d 672
(1971).
159. Philadelphia plans by means of a city planning commission authorized by the
Philadelphia Home Rule Charter. CHARTER §§ 4.4-600 to -604. See State ex rel. Bateman v.
Zachritz, 135 Ohio St. 580, 22 N.E. 2d 84 (1939).
160. BALTIMORE CTY CHARTER (1964 REV.) art. VII, § 79. CHARTER OF THE CITYOF
CINCINNATI art. II, § 5; CHARTER OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK § 202.

161. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 13131 (1957) confers all powers and authority of local
self-government upon Philadelphia. As construed by the courts, planning and zoning are
powers of local self-government; see note 158 supra.
162. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 14751-14762 (1957).
163. After an exhaustive survey, not one state constitution, enabling statute, or court
decision has been located that purports to remove zoning and planning from powers conferred
by home rule.
164. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 1-302(a)(10) (Supp. 1976-77).
165. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10101-11202 (1972 & Supp. 1976-77).
166. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11201 (1972).
167. School Dist. of Philadelphia v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment. 417 Pa. 277, 207 A.2d 864
(1965); Bartle v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 391 Pa. 207, 137 A.2d 239(1958), aff'gon opinion
of lower court 10 Pa. D. & C.2d 613 (1957).
168. The Title of the Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10101 (1972), and the purposes
provision, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10105 (Supp. 1976-77), specifically exclude cities of the
first and second class.
169. No topics remain open for independent home rule authority. See notes 119-21 and
accompanying text supra.
170. The Pittsburgh Charter was approved in the November election of 1974 and became
effective on January 5, 1976.
171. Campana v. City Planning Commission, No. 551 (Pa. C.P. Lyc. 1972), construing

are not subject to the Planning Code. 172 Third class cities adopting charters
under Act 62, on the other hand, must zone subject to provisions of the
Planning Code.'
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2. Taxation.-Municipal taxation presents monumental problems
to courts in construing grants of home rule powers based on imperio in
imperium-type provisions that impose the local interest-state concern
dichotomy. Few courts or commentators agree on the proper categorization
of taxation for purposes of validating or invalidating an exercise of power
deviating from the municipal codes. In a list purporting to divide governmental concerns into state and local categories, H.L. McBain lists taxation
as a "doubtful" subject of home rule authority. 174 Joseph McGoldrick,
who chronicled the development of home rule after McBain, characterized
municipal taxation as a "matter concerning which there is no consensus" ' 175 in terms of local-state dichotomization. In light of this lack of
consensus, virtually no constitutional amendment or enabling act implementing home rule has left the matter of taxation to the courts. Most have
provided express limitations that absolutely forbid deviate home rule
activity on the subject. 176 The First Class City Charter Act, for example,
prohibits Philadelphia from changing tax rate limitations or fixing subjects
of taxation. 177 This provision has affected a moratorium on home rule
78
power in the area of municipal taxation. 1
Act 62 is littered with express limitations on home rule powers of
taxation, including prohibitions against independent authority over filing
tax claims and liens, 179 fixing subjects of taxation, 180 fixing rates for
personal taxes of nonresidents, 18 1 and assessment of real or personal
property. 182 The only areas of authority not expressly dealt with by the Act
are municipal code tax rate limitations on taxes other than personal taxes on
nonresidents. Pertinent considerations of local self-government and
uniform applicability can be applied to determine whether these taxes fall
within home rule powers.
the grant of power provision, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 41304 (Supp. 1976-77), quoted in Pa.
League of Cities, Court Decision Adds FurtherStrength to Optional CharterLaw, 4 LEG.
BULL. 6 (1973).
172. Campana v. City Planning Commission, No. 551 (Pa. C.P. Lyc. 1972).
173. PA. STAT. ANN. tit.-53, § i-302(a)(10) (Supp. 1976-77).
174. H. MCBAIN, supra note 4, at 671.
175. J. MCGOLDRICK, LAW AND PRACTICE OF MUNICIPAL HOME RULE 1916-1930 at 319-51
(1933).
176. See, e.g., KAN. CONST. art. 12, § 5(b); NEV. CONST. art. 8, § 8; cf. TEX. REV. CIV.
STAT. ANN. art. 1175(7)-(9) (Vernon 1963).
177. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 13133(a)(8) (1957).
178. See Mastrangelo v. Buckley, 433 Pa. 352, 250 A.2d 447 (1969). Numerous cases in
recent years have liberally construed statutory grants of taxing power, but this additional
autonomy is not related to home rule powers. John Wanamaker, Philadelphia v. School Dist.,
441 Pa. 567, 274 A.2d 524 (1971); United Tavern Owners of Philadelphia v. School Dist., 441
Pa. 274,272 A.2d 868 (1971); Philadelphia Tax Review Bd. v. Smith, Kline & French Lab., 437
Pa. 197, 262 A.2d 135 (1970); Freeman v. City of Philadelphia, 187 Pa. Super. Ct. 290, 116 A.2d

349 (1955). See also Comment, Taxation underthe Sterling Act: The Nemesis of Philadelphia

Business, 45 TEMP. L.Q. 81 (1971).
179. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 1-302(a)(1) (1974).
180. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 1-302(a)(6) (1974).
181. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 1-302(a)(7) (1974). Nonproperty taxes tax such items as
income, earnings and net profits, mercantile trades, real property transfers, amusements, and
the use of parking facilities, bowling alleys, and coin-operated machines.
182. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 1-302(a)(8) (1974).

Difficulties of categorizing the power to fix tax rate limitations as a
state or local concern 1 83 have been resolved to some extent by the courts. In
1969 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, considering a challenge to an
unbudgeted interim tax levied by Philadelphia, discussed in detail the
84
city's powers of taxation under the Philadelphia Home Rule Charter.
This city contended that the new tax was authorized by provisions of the
Charter permitting the council to meet unanticipated emergencies 185 by
making operating appropriations beyond those included in the annual
budget. The court first cited the requirement that strict construction be
applied in determining whether the power to tax has been delegated by the
General Assembly to a municipality. 186 Its opinion leaned heavily against
the inclusion of even emergency powers of taxation within the power of
local self-government granted by the Philadelphia Act. Nevertheless, the
case should not be read as absolutely controlling powers granted under Act
62 since the decision was based on the First Class Charter Act's silence
on the existence of power to enact taxation measures other than those
provided in the budget. Also, unless powers granted by the Philadelphia
home rule enabling act are inconsistent with other statutes of the General
Assembly, the other statutes would remain in effect. ' 87 The First Class City
Act of 1919 provided that no interim taxing ordinance could be adopted by
the city council. 188 Since the home rule enabling act did not contradict the
Act of 1919, the latter was given precedence and pre-empted home rule
powers.
The strict construction and inconsistency limitations are not found in
Act 62. If a power is under the broad grant of Act 62, either expressly or
impliedly, it supersedes relevant statutory provisions regardless of inconsistency. Furthermore, since Act 62 mandates a liberal construction, 189 a
court will imply that the General Assembly intended to grant the power to
limit tax rates for taxes other than personal taxes on nonresidents. One
point made clear by the supreme court in 1969, however, is that the court is
disposed against permitting home rule municipalities to exercise independent taxing powers as matters of purely local concern.
The remaining consideration is how taxation fares under the
"uniformly applicable" test for delegation of home rule authority. If tax
rate limitations are not covered by uniformly applicable laws, the home
rule municipality has power in that area regardless of the outcome of the
state-local categorization.'9 Tax rate limitations on subjects not expressly
dealt with in Act 62 are found in the Local Tax Enabling Act and in several
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

See notes 174-75 and accompanying text supra.
Mastrangelo v. Buckley, 433 Pa. 352, 250 A.2d 447 (1969).
PA. CODE tit. 53, § 2.2-301(a).
Mastrangelo v. Buckley, 433 Pa. 352, 363, 250 A.2d 447, 453 (1969).
Id. at 368-74, 250 A.2d at 455-58 (1969).
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 12552 (1957).
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 1-301 (1974).
See note 94-97 and accompanying text supra.

provisions of the municipal code. 191 The Local Tax Enabling Act is not
uniformly applicable throughout the Commonwealth since cities of the first
class are excluded from its provisions.' 92 Because there are no uniformly
applicable provisions imposing rate limitations on taxation other than those
of personal taxes on nonresidents, it may be that the topics are open for
193
independent home rule authority.
3. Sanctions and Public Morals.-Protectionof public morals and
punishment of crimes' 94 have traditionally been considered police powers
within the province of the state. 195 Pennsylvania is no exception to this
rule, and has enacted a comprehensive crimes code that is uniformly
applicable state-wide. 196 Home rule charter municipalities are prohibited
by express limitation in Act 62 from exercising independent authority to
impose criminal sanctions upon perpetrators of felonies and
97
misdemeanors.'
The power to set punishment for lesser offenses, i.e., civil violations
and some summary offenses, on the other hand, traditionally emanates
from the police power of the unit that enforces them.' 98 Ordinarily,
municipalities are given wide latitude to define civil offenses in accordance
with the desires of the community; but, even for civil offenses, a fundamental authorization still must have been given by the General
Assembly. 199
The grant of home rule authority under Act 62 changes this to a
degree. The remnants of the ban on municipal prosecution of summary
offenses is, by implication, fully lifted. This does not mean, however, that
municipalities may indiscriminately legislate on the matter by authority of
their home rule charters. To the extent that authorization for punishing the
summary offense appears in the various municipal codes, home rule
191. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 6908, 6917 (1972); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 25941,36811
(1957); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 37531 (Supp. 1976-77). Provisions in the municipal codes are
the more general limitations on setting tax rates but are still relevant.
192. Philadelphia is impliedly excluded from the Act's coverage. SeePA. STAT. ANN. tit.
53, §§ 6901, 6902 (1972 & Supp. 1976-77); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 6902 (1972 & Supp.
1976-77).
193. Government publications reach the same conclusion but seem to rely more on the
presumption that, in light of the detailed prohibitions on powers of taxation, the General
Assembly intended to grant the power to raise limits in specified areas since it had not
expressly prohibited it. L. GAMM, J. JAMES & J. KARLESKY, STRUCTURES AND FUNCTIONS OF
PENNSYLVANIA LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: ISSUES FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT STUDY 111-3 (1974).
This approach, however, seems less than satisfactory.
194. Criminal offenses include felonies, misdemeanors and many summary offenses.
195. Youngstown v. Evans, 121 Ohio St. 342, 168 N.E. 844 (1929); Brewer v. State, 13
Tex. Crim. 522,24 S.W.2d 409 (1930); State ex rel. Keefe v. Schmeige, 251 Wis. 79,28 N.W.2d
345 (1947); M. CARRINGER, PROCEDURE IN SUMMARY CONVICTIONS IN PENNSYLVANIA I (2d ed.
1953).
196. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 101-7505 (1973 & Supp. 1976-77).
197. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 1-302(a)(9) (1974). A similar limitation is implied in the First
Class City Charter Act. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 13133(b) (1957).
198. State v. Crabtree Co., 218 Minn. 36, 15 N.W.2d 98 (1944); In reCalhoun, 87 Ohio
App. 193,94N.E.2d 388(1949); King v. Arlington County, 195 Va. 1084,81 S.E.2d587(1954).
199. The obvious exceptions to the rule are the third class cities operating under an
Optional Plan Charter. They have been given quasi-home rule power despite the lack of a true
grant of home rule authority. See Greenberg v. City of Bradford, 432 Pa. 611, 248 A.2d 51
(1968). But see City of Erie v. Northwestern Pa. Food Council, 14 Pa. Commw. Ct. 355, 322
A.2d 407 (1974).

powers may be expected to supersede inconsistent statutory authorization. 200 If authorization is not found in the municipal codes, the question
must be analyzed further to determine the presence of a purely local
interest. If the statute deals with a summary offense of state-wide concern
and the statute is also uniformly applicable, home rule authority is
pre-empted in all respects, including the power to define and punish the
offense. 20 1 Conversely, if the subject is one of purely local concern, home
rule powers supersede the statutory authorization and give rise to independent authority to define summary offenses and set punishment regardless of
uniform coverage. 202 Wide latitude has been extended to Philadelphia in
the exercise of local police power, 203 and the same should be expected
under Act 62.
4. Health and Safety. Statutory provisions dealing with health and
safety cover a wide range of topics and are scattered throughout the
thousands of Pennsylvania statutes in force. Legislation that protects the
public health and safety is traditionally classified as an exercise of the
police power of the particular government unit. 204 Functions performed
individually by all municipalities are now believed to flow from the almost
inalienable right of the community to protect the health and welfare of its
citizenry. 20 5 Consequently, many health and safety matters are classified
as purely local concerns properly within the grants of power conferred
under home rule provisions in most states, 21 including Pennsylvania's
First Class City Charter Act. 20 7 Act 62 does not deviate substantially
200. See notes 95-97 and accompanying text supra.
201. Neil House Hotel Co. v. City of Columbus, 144 Ohio St. 248, 58 N.E.2d 665 (1944);
Commonwealth v. Ray, 218 Pa. Super. Ct. 72,272 A.2d 275(1970), rev 'donother grounds, 448
Pa. 307, 292 A.2d 410 (1972). See notes 94-97 and accompanying text supra.
202. State v. Simpson, 78 N.D. 360,49 N.W.2d 777 (1951); Village of Struthers v. Sokol,
108 Ohio St. 268, 140 N.E. 519 (1923). Cf. Lennox v. Clark, 372 Pa. 355,93 A.2d834(1953);
Ebald v. Philadelphia, 387 Pa. 407, 128 A.2d 352 (1958), aff'g on opinion of lower court 10 Pa.
D. & C.2d 613 (1957).
203. Commonwealth v. Cabell, 199 Pa. Super. Ct. 513, 185 A.2d 611 (1962). In this case,
the superior court upheld a Philadelphia ordinance that made falsification of civil service
examinations a misdemeanor, punishable by up to 90 days in jail and a $300 fine. Philadelphia
is the only municipality in the Commonwealth that can create offenses classified as misdemeanors for violations of its ordinances. Finkelhor, Municipal Corporations, 26 PiTT. L. REV.
195, 211 (1964-65). This circumstance will not change with Act 62, though increased flexibility
in the area of civil and summary penalties can be expected.
204. Adams v. City of New Kensington, 357 Pa. 557, 55 A.2d 392 (1947); Philadelphia
Electric Co. v. City of Philadelphia, 301 Pa. 291, 152 A. 23 (1930); Pennsylvania Co. v. James,
81 Pa. 194 (1894).
205. Block v. Mills, 29 Pa. Dist. 575 (1920). Most cases on point, however, hold that
municipalities have no inherent police powers. See, e.g., Wright v. Husbands, 36 Del. Ch. 416,
131 A.2d 322 (1957); Hyson v. Montgomery Cty. Council, 242 Md. 55, 217 A.2d 578 (1966);
People ex rel. Skokie Town House Builders, Inc. v. Village of Morton Grove, 16 I11. 2d 183,
157 N.E.2d 33 (1959); Simmons v. City of Shreveport, 221 La. 902, 60 So. 2d 867 (1952).
206. Woolverton v. City & County of Denver, 146 Colo. 247, 361 P.2d 982 (1961);
McBriety v. City of Baltimore, 219 Md. 223, 148 A.2d 408 (1959); State v. Crabtree, 218 Minn.
36, 15 N.W.2d 98 (1944). Contra, City of Grand Haven v. Grocer's Co-op Dairy Co., 300
Mich. 694, 48 N.W.2d 362 (1951).
207. Kelley v. City of Philadelphia, 382 Pa. 459, 115 A.2d 238 (1955). Cf. Commonwealth
v. Cabell, 199 Pa. Super. Ct. 513, 185 A.2d 611 (1962). Third class cities operating under
optional charter plans have not faired as well. City of Erie v. Northwestern Pa. Food Council,
14 Pa. Commw. Ct. 355, 322 A.2d 407 (1974) (ordinance requiring transparent wrapping on all
sides of prepackaged meat held invalid on the ground that the field had been pre-empted by
state regulation).

from other statutes in this regard and confers substantial authority to
regulate activities affecting local welfare.
Some guidance is provided in the Act by its express prohibition of the
independent regulation of certain health and safety matters. The Act
forbids local legislation inconsistent with statutory provisions regulating
foods, goods, or services. 20 8 Similarly, municipalities have no independent authority to regulate occupations considered a threat to the local health
and safety because of an express limitation found in the Act. 20 9 The home
rule municipality is also forbidden to regulate in any manner the transfer,
ownership, transportation, or possession of firearms. 2 10 While-these are
pervasive prohibitions, fertile areas remain open for independent home
rule legislation. For example, the Act further states that nothing therein
should be construed as removing the municipality's authority to regulate
buildings in any manner that it deems appropriate. 2 11 Ordinances governing burning, street lighting, or establishment of a health department or
municipal hospital all fall within the grant of home rule powers under the
Act.
5. Water and Sewage.-Though some aspects of the power to
regulate waste disposal and water quality could arguably be included under
health and safety, water and sewage problems require separate examination. Presently, municipalities provide water purification plants and sewage disposal facilities primarily under the aegis of municipal authorities.
Authorities are semi-independent governmental organizations created solely by power of the state and initiated largely to avoid constitutional
limitations on municipal debts. 212 They are formed by compact between a
municipality and the state through articles of incorporation and can exist
indefinitely. 213 While municipalities are not bound to use or to continue to
use authorities as the medium of water and sewage services, most
municipalities find it to their advantage to do so in terms of increased
208. No municipality shall enact or promulgate any ordinance or regulation with
respect to definitions, sanitation, safety, health, standards of identity or labeling
pertaining to the manufacture, processing, storage, distribution and sale of any
foods, goods or services subject to any Commonwealth laws or regulations unless
such municipal ordinance or regulation is uniform in all respects with such
Commonwealth laws and regulations.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 1-302(b)(iv)(1974).

209. No municipality which adopts a home rule charter shall be any time thereunder
determine duties, responsibilities or requirements placed upon businesses, occupations and employers, including the duty to withhold, remit or report taxes or
penalties levied or imposed upon them or upon persons in their employment ....
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 1-302(d) (1974).
210. "No municipality shall enact any ordinance or take any other action dealing with the
regulation of the transfer, ownership, transportation or possession of firearms." PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 53, § 1-302(e) (1974).
211. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 1-302(b)(iv) (1974).
212. Commonwealth v. Erie Metro. Transit Auth., 444 Pa. 345, 281 A.2d 882 (1971);
Whitemarsh Tpk. Auth. v. Elwert, 413 Pa. 329, 196 A.2d 843 (1964); Highland Sewer & Water
v. Engelbach, 208 Pa. Super. Ct. 1,220 A.2d 390 (1966); COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS,
STATE PUBLIC AUTHORITIES 4-5 (1970).

213. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 303 (1974). Duration depends mainly on redemption of all
outstanding bonds, which may have a term as long as forty years. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§
307(a), 317 (1974 & Supp. 1976-77).

financial flexibility and, therefore, have little motive to abandon them for
other means. 2 14 In considering home rule power to regulate sewage and
water, one must be aware that the implementing bodies are likely to be
essentially creatures of the Commonwealth.
The Municipalities Authorities Act of 1945215 regulates the creation
and operation of municipal authorities, including those engaged in supplying water and waste disposal. The Act deals primarily with procedural
matters, such as the acquisition of facilities, 216 rather than with matters of a
substantive nature. It follows that home rule municipalities are not given
independent authority to regulate the procedure of water and sewage
authorities but are given limited power to control their substantive decisions depending on the pre-emptive nature of other relevant statutes.
Philadelphia, under its grant of power of local self-government, possesses
little power to act independently on substantive issues of sewage disposal
and water. 217 Sewage disposal and water are not regarded as matters of
purely local concern. Most statutory provisions dealing with water and
sewage, however, are found in the various municipal codes.2 1 8 The codes'
lack of uniform applicability causes them to fail to pre-empt home rule
powers under Act 62. Some provisions on water and sewage appear in
chapters of the General Municipal Law, but many of those provisions are
not uniformly applicable state-wide because of special repeals and applicability only to a particular class.2 19 The remaining provisions on water and
sewage in the General Municipal Law are uniformly applicable statewide 220 and the local interest-state concern test must be applied to them to
determine whether home rule powers under Act 62 can supersede these acts
of the General Assembly. As noted above, water and sewage are generally
not considered matters of purely local concern because of the extraterritorial effects that may be experienced in disposing of sewage and procuring a
water supply. 22 Home rule powers will not supersede statutes on water and
sewage that are uniformly applicable state-wide.
6. Other Substantive Powers.-For many areas of substantive
power, Act 62 does not provide assistance in determining whether the
power is included under the grant of home rule. The municipality must
make its own determination, independent of any guidance from the Act.
The analytical framework of the local interest-state concern and uniform
214. COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, STATE PUBLIC AUTHORITIES 9 (1970).
215. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 301-22 (1974 & Supp. 1976-77).
216. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 314(1974). The primary substantive provisions of the Act
are found in §§ 306 and 307, purposes and powers of municipal authorities. PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
53, §§ 306, 307 (1974 & Supp. 1976-77).
217. Tax Review Bd. v. Weiner, 398 Pa. 381, 157 A.2d 879 (1960); Monaghan v. City of
Philadelphia, 5 Pa. D. & C.2d 329 (1965).
218. Codified in scattered sections of tit. 53, PA. STAT. ANN.
219. The following sections have been repealed for certain classes of municipalities or
are of limited application: PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 2201-2203, 2311-2313, 2331-2332, 2341,
2342, 2351-2354, 2361, 2801-2815, 2831, 2901-2906, 2931-2934, 2961-2967, 2991-2993 (1974).
220. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 2231-2234, 2261-2265, 2291-2296, 2861-2877, 3001-3101
(1974 & Supp. 1976-77).
221. See note 217 and accompanying text supra.

applicability tests may be utilized in examining the area of power and will
result in accurate predictions of home rule authority. The technique is
illustrated below within several important areas of municipal activity.
Municipal finance includes a variety of topics dealt with throughout
the municipal codes and General Municipal Law ranging from calendar
months of the fiscal year222 to local debt limitations.2 23 The subject is not
easily categorized as a state or local concern. Like taxation, municipal
finance is a matter in which the state has at least concurrent interest with the
224
municipality in ensuring responsible expenditure of local tax dollars.
McGoldrick has listed finance among matters concerning which there is no
consensus among states using the imperio in imperium approach; 225 the
226
case law confirms this conclusion.
The other criteria for inclusion of municipal finance in home rule
powers, regardless of its status as a local or state concern, is the test of
uniform applicability. To the extent that regulations covering municipal
finance are found in the various municipal codes, 2 27 those topics are
superseded by home rule powers since the code provisions are not
uniformly applicable state-wide. Provisions on municipal finance found in
the General Municipal Law, 228 however, present a more difficult problem
to resolve. They are arguably applicable state-wide and hence would
pre-empt home rule powers. But closer examination of each provision is
necessary. The chapter on municipal finance in the General Municipal
Law229 contains a hodgepodge of provisions that are not part of a single
legislative act. Many of the provisions have been repealed for certain
municipal classifications2 3 ° and, with respect to these provisions, home
222.

PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 17034, 25651, 36801, 65901 (1957 & Supp. 1976-77); PA.

STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 1780 (1956).
223. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 6780-51 to 6782-59, 23108 (Supp. 1976-77); PA. CONST. art

IX, §§ 10, 12.
224. See Mendelson, Paths to Constitutional Home Rule for Municipalities, 6 VAND. L.
REV. 66, 69-71 (1952).
225.

J. MCGOLDRICK, LAW AND PRACTICE OF MUNICIPAL HOME RULE 338-40 (1933).

226. Phillips v. Tate, 431 Pa. 124, 244 A.2d 774 (1968), provides a typical example. The
lower court unanimously disapproved a provision of Philadelphia's Home Charter altering the
dates of the city's fiscal year. The court reasoned that since Philadelphia was locked into the
tax scheme of the First Class City Code, which provides for annual taxing periods, it had no
power to enact an 18-month budget calling for two taxing periods. In a 4-3 decision the
supreme court reversed and held that the Charter did authorize alteration of the fiscal year. Id.
at 126-27, 244 A.2d at 775. The court's reasoning is rather perfunctory with no citation to
authority other than provisions of the Charter. There was no discussion of authorization of
the Charter provision.
227. This covers a multitude of provisions too numerous to list. It can be noted,
however, that provisions of the municipal codes dealing with contracts are closely related to
provisions on municipal finance and may be considered together for purposes of determining
home rule powers. For provisions on contracts, see PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 23308.1-23310
(1957 & Supp. 1976-77); § 30101 (1957); §§ 36901-36918 (Supp. 1976-77); §§ 46401-46411 (1966
& Supp. 1976-77); §§ 53201-53209 (1957 & Supp. 1976-77); § 56801-56811 (1957 & Supp.
1976-77); §865801-65809 (1957 & Supp. 1976-77).
228. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 5401-5653 (1972 & Supp. 1976-77). The provisions on
contracts are found at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 1001-1003, 1031 (1974).
229. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 5401-5653 (1972 & Supp. 1976-77).
230. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 5461,5462,5465-5468,5621-23(1972 & Supp. 1976-77). All
sections of the chapter on contracts within the General Municipal Law have been repealed for
one or more classes of municipalities. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 1001, 1002 (1974) were
repealed as to third class cities. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 1003 (1974) was repealed as to third

rule powers supersede the statutes because of lack of uniform applicability.
Other provisions of the chapter are directed at only one or two municipal
classes. 2 3 ' Home rule powers under Act 62 can be expected similarly to
supersede topics covered by them. The remaining provisions of the chapter
must be considered as uniformly applicable state-wide, 232 thus doubtful
areas for home rule power.
Authority to regulate municipal transportation is another area in
which Act 62 is not determinative of home rule powers. Municipal
authority to create and regulate intra-municipal transit facilities is delegated primarily by provisions of the municipal codes. 233 Since these
provisions are not uniformly applicable state-wide, they do not pre-empt
home rule powers, regardless of their classification as state or local
concerns. Furthermore, purely intra-municipal transportation must be
considered a matter of only local concern. 234 This conclusion is borne out
by the Philadelphia experience in independently regulating intra-city
transportation. 235 It should be noted, however, that to the extent the
municipality employs authorities to establish and maintain transportation
facilities the municipality becomes subject to the same considerations
discussed in the preceding section on water and sewage. 236
The regulation of public utilities is yet another area of authority with
which Act 62 does not conclusively deal. The authority of municipalities to
acquire and maintain public utilities is limited to that granted by the
General Assembly in the Public Utility Act,237 notwithstanding the adoption of a home rule charter. The public utility has been held to be a matter of
state-wide concern, requiring policy decisions that can best be made at the
central level by the legislature and the Public Utility Commission. 238 The
Public Utility Act is a comprehensive, uniformly applicable statute that
regulates an area of state-wide concern. Pennsylvania municipalities
adopting home rule charters under Act 62 are not likely to acquire
independent authority to regulate public utilities.
By employing analysis similar to that used in these examples, one
may determine the home rule status of any matter of potential municipal
action.
class cities, boroughs, townships, and counties. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 1031 (1974) was
repealed as to third class cities, boroughs, and first and second class townships.
231. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 5431-5433, 5464, 5469-5475, 5501-5509 (1972 & Supp.
1976-77).
232. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, 99 5401-5411, 5421-5424, 5476-5477, 5521-5524, 5571-5572,
5591-5596, 5651-5653 (1972 & Supp. 1975).
233. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 15551-15572, 25481-25498 (1957 & Supp. 1976-77).
234. Village of Perrysburg v. Ridgway, 108 Ohio St. 245, 140 N.E. 595 (1923); Froelich v.
City of Cleveland, 99 Ohio St. 376, 124 N.E. 212 (1919). See Fordham & Asher, supra note 14,
at 52-61.
235. No exercise of power by the City of Philadelphia over purely intra-city transportation has been challenged.
236. See notes 212-16 and accompanying text supra. City of Philadelphia v. Southeastern
Pa. Transp. Auth., 8 Pa. Commw. Ct. 280, 303 A.2d 247 (1973).
237. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 66, §§ I 101-1562 (1959 & Supp. 1976-77).
238. "State-wide public welfare dictates that the Public Utility Commission exercise the
control given it as a matter of policy." Duquesne Light Co. v. Monroeville Borough, 449 Pa.
573, 581-82, 298 A.2d 252, 257 (1972). See also Duquesne Light v. Upper St. Clair, 377 Pa. 323,
105 A.2d 287 (1954). Cf. Nugent v. City of East Providence, 103 R.I. 518,238 A.2d 758 (1968).

V.

Conclusion
Act 62 is far from perfect in its implementation of home rule. But
given a favorable judicial and legislative climate within which to operate,
and given aggressive experimentation by charter municipalities, it provides the potential for a home rule experience at least as successful as that
enjoyed in Philadelphia. Only time will reveal whether the challenge of
creating adequate home rule will be accepted in Pennsylvania.
Reasoned judgment on the part of all concerned will lead to a
satisfactory result. For its part, the General Assembly should not be overly
anxious to recall the limited powers it has made available under the Act, for
in the ultimate analysis it decides what home rule powers exist. Critics may
argue that this situation is not home rule at all, since the legislature has final
authority. This is certainly true in a sense, but only insofar as the legislature
greedily withdraws powers that it has conferred. Patience with experimentation by municipalities should guide the legislature in its determination of
permissible home rule powers. Only when it appears that individual efforts
are inadequate to meet a common problem or when the matter is patently
one of state-wide concern should the legislature intervene and pre-empt an
area of authority. If local self-government is truly the intent of the
legislature, this is the approach that it must follow.
The judiciary is confronted with the task of giving meaning to the
vague and sometimes conflicting language of Act 62. Reason should
compel the courts to give home rule under the Act at least the same
opportunity for success that was given Philadelphia under the First Class
City Charter Act. The judiciary should not reduce the heralded grant of
home rule to an illusion and a nullity by interpreting the act in such a way as
unduly to constrict the opportunities presented. A broad interpretation
would harm no interest and can only promote the goal of effective
government. A degree of local self-government can be useful in relieving
the burdens of centralized management by the General Assembly.
Finally, the municipalities themselves play a major role in the
ultimate success or failure of Act 62. Large and small municipalities alike
should not be reluctant to take advantage of the powers offered. While
charter adoption is not an inexpensive process, the returns in the form of
community improvements can make the expense worthwhile. Prudent
decisions concerning the exercise of power will avoid unnecessary legal
challenges. Home rule is intended to benefit the municipalities and, while
Act 62 is not a Garden of Eden in terms of bountiful grants of power,
municipalities will largely reap what their efforts sow.
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